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Abstract
We consider a set-up in which a principal must decide whether or not to legalise
a socially undesirable activity. The law is enforced by a monitor who may be bribed
to conceal evidence of the oﬀence and who may also engage in extortionary practices.
The principal only declares the activity illegal if the activity is “very harmful” and
if the private beneﬁt (received by the agent if she breaks the law) is “high”. We
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11 Introduction
Corruption is—and has always been—a source of concern for policy makers. For ex-
ample, Theodore Roosevelt in a 1903 speech said: “we must show our abhorrence of
... corruption, in public and in private life”.1 More recently, in 1999 the World Bank
president James Wolfensohn asserted that: “... so far as [the World Bank] is concerned,
there is nothing more important than the issue of corruption”.2 Similar words also came
out of the mouth of George Bush in the wake of recent scandals that shook corporate
America. Policy makers have good reasons to put the ﬁght against corruption high on the
political agenda: Mauro (1995) showed that corrupt countries experience lower growth
and James Wolfensohn argued that it is the poor who suﬀer the most from it.
Obviously, corruption can take many forms as it is prevalent in the political, corporate
and criminal spheres of society. To illustrate the forms of corruption that we will study
in this paper, consider the following examples.3 In the 1960s and early 1970s the Hong
Kong police was very corrupt and regularly received bribes in order not to report ille-
gal gambling activities. Prior to 1975 the Philippines’ Bureau of Internal Revenue was
renowned for its corrupt tax inspectors. In one famous example two tax inspectors found
evidence of a 2 million pesos tax fraud. Instead of reporting this to their superiors, they
went to the contravening company and asked for one million pesos in exchange for their
silence. In the early 1970s Singapore Custom oﬃcials were given bribes in order to allow
some illegal imports. What those examples share in common is that people receive bribes
in order to conceal evidence of illegal behaviour. Henceforth we refer to this practice as
ex post corruption. Ex post refers to the fact that the collusive agreement arose after the
occurrence of the illegal activity.
1Address at the Dedication Ceremonies of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition on April 30, 1903.
http://www.jmu.edu/madison/center/main pages/madison archives/life/secretary/la purchase/roosevelt.htm
2Plenary Address at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa, 9–15
October, 1999. http://ww1.transparency.org/iacc/9th iacc/papers/day1/plenary/d1pl jwolfensohn.html
3All examples in this paragraph are taken from Klitgaard (1988).
2While ex post corruption has been extensively studied in the economics literature (see
below for more details) other types of corruption have received scant attention. For
example, in Hong Kong the police force had to give the impression that they were serious
about tackling illegal gambling. To save appearances they colluded with the gambling
maﬁa to produce “fake” evidence of their eﬀorts to curb illegal gambling activities as
explained in the following quote:
An arrangement [between the Hong Kong police and the gambling maﬁa]
would sometimes be made for paid “actors” to substitute for the casino’s
staﬀ and regular customers. When arrested, the actors had their ﬁnes paid
by the [maﬁa] and were released after a night in jail. (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 99)
Henceforth we refer to this practice as ex ante corruption. In contrast with ex post cor-
ruption, the collusive agreement here arose before the occurrence of the illegal activity.
In a related vein, examples abound in which one party creates fake evidence to indict
another. For example, in Lahore (Pakistan) police oﬃcers are notorious for putting drugs
in the hotel rooms of unsuspecting tourists. The tourists then have to bribe the police
oﬃcers to avoid going to jail. Similarly, the corrupt Philippino tax inspectors did not
solely receive bribes to hide evidence of the oﬀence. Instead, they also pretended that
some taxpayers had understated their taxable income even if this was not true. Some
gullible taxpayers believed that they had made an error in their income statement and
then bribed the tax oﬃcial to induce him not to report this “error” to his superiors.
The Singapore Custom oﬃcials also engaged in similar activities. Practices of this kind
illustrate what we model as extortion in this paper. Note that extortion is crucially
diﬀerent from ex ante corruption: in the case of the latter, the Hong Kong police force
needs the maﬁa’s consent (and the participation of actors) to create evidence of illegal
behaviour. If the police oﬃcer extorts, however, then he creates (fake) evidence of the
oﬀence without the tourist’s consent. Observe also that we deﬁne extortion as planting
(fake) evidence of an oﬀence regardless of whether the tourist pays a bribe or ends up in
jail.
3Suppose you are the president of Pakistan. How should you deter extortion and ex post
corruption? Should you raise penalties? Should you raise rewards for reporting evidence
of illegal behaviour? Should you instead go for a more drastic solution and legalise the
use of drugs?4 Alternatively, suppose you are the Hong Kong governor. How should you
deter ex ante and ex post corruption? In this paper we develop a principal-monitor-agent
model to tackle these questions. More speciﬁcally, we consider a set-up in which an agent
chooses whether or not to undertake a socially undesirable activity.5 The agent derives
a private beneﬁt from undertaking the activity. The principal (i.e. the social planner)
must decide (i) whether or not to declare the activity illegal and if so (ii) the jail sen-
tence to be imposed on the agent and the reward to be given to the monitor in case
the monitor reports evidence of the oﬀence. The monitor can either uncover evidence
of illegal behaviour by undertaking costly monitoring or he can plant fake evidence of
the oﬀence. First, (in Section 3) we assume that the monitor does not need the agent’s
consent to plant fake evidence (as is the case with extortion). Next (in Section 4) we
assume that the monitor needs the agent’s consent (or her active participation) to create
the evidence of the oﬀence.
Our analysis of ex post corruption and extortion suggests that the principal only wants
to declare an activity illegal if the activity is “very harmful” and if the private bene-
ﬁt is “high”. To understand this result, suppose the private beneﬁt is “not high” and
that the principal declares the activity illegal. In our model if the monitor catches an
oﬀending agent, he can prevent the agent from consuming her private beneﬁt.6 An of-
4The U.S. interwar experience nicely illustrates that governments sometimes prefer to legalise un-
desirable activities. As is well known, alcohol prohibition led to widespread corruption and little law
abiding behaviour. This induced some states to legalise the consumption of alcohol in the 1930’s.
5For example, the activity could be: smoking cannabis, drinking alcohol, gambling, setting up an
illegal casino, etc.
6 For example, if a police oﬃcer catches a tourist in the possession of cannabis, he will give the
drugs to his supervisor as “proof” that the tourist broke the law. In that case the tourist will never
smoke her cannabis (and will thus never get her private beneﬁt). Our results do not crucially hinge on
our assumption that M can prevent A from consuming her private beneﬁt with probability one. If the
4fending agent has therefore two good reasons to bribe the monitor. First, she wants
to avoid a jail sentence and second, she wants to consume her private beneﬁt. If the
agent is framed, however, she only wants to bribe the monitor to avoid going to jail.
Hence, in equilibrium the monitor will receive a bigger bribe if he catches an oﬀending
agent than if he decides to frame her. The greater the private beneﬁt, the greater the
diﬀerence between the two bribes. Furthermore, we assume that monitoring is a costly
activity while extorting is not. Hence, if the private beneﬁt is “not high”, the bigger
bribe does not compensate the monitor for his disutility of eﬀort and he never monitors.
The agent knows this and therefore always breaks the law. As the diﬀerence between the
two bribes does not depend on the harmfulness of the illegal activity, this result holds
even if the illegal activity were inﬁnitely harmful. Suppose now that the private bene-
ﬁt is “high” and that the activity is declared illegal. Then, the agent and the monitor
play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the agent randomises between breaking
the law and not breaking the law, while the monitor randomises between extorting and
providing eﬀort to uncover evidence of the possible oﬀence. The principal knows this.
She also knows that by changing the punishment-reward structure she inﬂuences both
equilibrium probabilities. If the monitor exerts eﬀort, welfare decreases by the disutility
of monitoring. However, monitoring also induces the agent to abide by the law, which
raises welfare. If the activity is not “very harmful”, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second
one. In that case the principal wants to set the punishment-reward structure such as to
implement an equilibrium in which the monitor never exerts eﬀort. We show that this
cannot be implemented by any ﬁnite punishment-reward structure. Hence, the principal
strictly gains by declaring the activity legal. However, if the activity is “very harmful”,
then the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one and the principal (strictly) gains by declar-
ing the activity illegal.
monitor could only prevent the agent from consuming her private beneﬁt with probability p > 0, then the
expected bribe he gets if he catches an oﬀending agent would still be bigger than the bribe he gets if he
were to frame an innocent individual, and all our results should go through. A more detailed discussion
of this assumption is provided in section 3.
5We also show that the agent is more likely to abide by the law if the monitor has a lot
of bargaining power, or if the disutility of monitoring is small, or if the agent derives a
big private beneﬁt from the illegal activity. Finally, we show that if the monitor needs
the agent’s consent to create the evidence of illegal behaviour (i.e. in the case of ex ante
corruption), then the principal can always implement an outcome close to ﬁrst best by
punishing the agent inﬁnitely hard.
Our paper belongs to the literature on collusion (or corruption) when the principal can-
not contract on output.7 No paper in that literature has found that the principal can
gain by legalising a socially undesirable activity. Moreover, only Hindriks et al. (1999)
and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) allow the monitor to extort and to engage in ex post
corruption.8 In Polinsky and Shavell (2001) it is never optimal to legalise the undesirable
activity because it is implicitly assumed that both corruption and extortion activities
are costless. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the principal prefers to legalise the activity pre-
cisely because monitoring is more costly (in terms of eﬀort) than extorting. Hindriks et
al. (1999) analyse a set-up in which a tax inspector can extort and engage in ex post
corruption. However, they are primarily interested in studying the eﬃciency and equity
consequences of diﬀerent tax schemes which is not the purpose of this paper.
Another strand in the literature on collusion (or corruption) in three-tier organizations
considers a set-up with adverse selection and moral hazard in which the principal can
7See, among others, Strausz (1997), Hindriks et al. (1999), Carrillo (2000a, 2000b), Polinsky and
Shavell (2001), Mishra (2002).
8Strausz (1997) analyses a similar set-up as ours except that he does not allow the monitor to extort or
engage in ex ante corruption. In Carrillo (2000a, 2000b) the monitor’s wage is independent of his report
and he also restricts attention to the ex post corruption case. Mishra (2002) considers a two-monitor
set-up and, using eﬃciency as a benchmark, compares a vertical hierarchy (i.e. the second monitor
monitors the ﬁrst one) with a horizontal one (i.e. both monitors monitor the agent). As in the previous
papers, monitors do not extort nor engage in ex-ante corruption.
6contract on the agent’s output.9 In particular, Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1993) have shown
that the principal may prefer not to hire the monitor10 if her signal is suﬃciently im-
precise or if the agent’s maximal punishment is low. We show that their negative result
also holds if the principal cannot contract on output provided that the monitor can ex-
tort and engage in ex post corruption. Moreover, in our model the principal may prefer
to legalise the activity even if the monitoring technology is perfect and if the agent’s
maximal punishment is arbitrarily high. Khalil and Lawarr´ ee (2003) assume that the
principal cannot commit ex ante to hiring the monitor after the output realisation. They
show that, due to conﬂicting non-commitment and ex post corruption constraints, the
principal may also prefer to legalise the undesirable activity. In contrast, our result does
not rely on a commitment problem.
2 The benchmark model without corruption or extortion
An agent (A) must choose whether or not to undertake an activity. If she does not
undertake the activity, this results in welfare ¯ w and a zero payoﬀ to A. If she undertakes
the activity, this leads to welfare w and, if undetected, to a private beneﬁt of π > 0.11
The activity is socially undesirable in the sense that w+π < ¯ w. The principal (P) must
decide whether or not to legalise the activity. If she declares the activity illegal, she must
rely on a monitor (M) to enforce the law. M’s outside option is equal to zero and he is
protected by limited liability. If M decides to monitor, he suﬀers a disutility normalised
to 1. If M monitors when A broke the law, then he ﬁnds evidence of A’s oﬀence with
probability one.12 If M decides not to monitor, his disutility is zero and A’s possible
9See, among others, Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1993), Kessler (2000), Khalil and Lawarr´ ee (2003), as
well as the classic paper by Tirole (1986).
10In our model this corresponds to legalising the undesirable activity.
11π is expressed in monetary terms. π can also be interpreted as a sum of money generated by A’s
activity. We will come back to this interpretation on page 20.
12It may be more realistic to assume that M only ﬁnds evidence of the oﬀence (when A broke the law)
with probability λ < 1. Setting λ = 1, however, simpliﬁes the exposition without aﬀecting our results.
7oﬀence remains undetected. M’s choice of action is not contractible. If M does not
present any evidence of the oﬀence to P, then w.l.o.g. we assume that P compensates M
with a zero transfer.13 Otherwise, if M presents evidence of the oﬀence, then P transfers
reward r to M and puts A for x years in jail.14 Let f be the monetary equivalent of the
jail sentence (i.e. A is indiﬀerent between paying a ﬁne f and spending x years in jail).
As a convention, in what follows we shall assume that P and A are female, while M is
male.
Let α ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈ [0,1] denote the probability with which A abides by the law
and M monitors, respectively. P’s objective is to maximise social welfare by optimally
choosing whether or not to legalise the activity. In the analysis of this problem, we
adopt the following tie-breaking rule: if indiﬀerent between legalising and not legalising
the activity, P will legalise it.15 If P declares the activity legal, then, straightforwardly,




w + α∗∆w − µ∗ + (1 − α∗)[(1 − µ∗)π − µ∗(r + f)] (1)
s.t. (1 − α∗)µ∗r − µ∗ ≥ 0 (2)
α∗ ∈ argmax (1 − α)[(1 − µ∗)π − µ∗f] (3)
µ∗ ∈ argmax (1 − α∗)µr − µ (4)
f, r ≥ 0 (5)
α, µ ∈ [0,1] (6)
13This is w.l.o.g. because rewarding M for reporting no evidence only decreases his incentives to
monitor. Hence, in the absence of any evidence, P should give the lowest possible reward to M. As M
is protected by limited liability and possesses a zero outside option, his lowest possible reward is equal
to zero.
14We assume that P can only punish A by sending her to jail. We will argue below (see Section 3, p.
20) that this is without loss of generality.
15This rule is reasonable if making the activity legal frees up the resources for other enforcement
activities without aﬀecting the equilibrium behaviour. This is, indeed the case in the results we ﬁnd
below (see also further discussion on p. 16).
8(3) and (6) ensure that A, taking µ∗ and f as given, chooses α to maximise her utility.
Similarly, (4) and (6) ensure that M, taking r and α∗ as given, chooses µ optimally.
Equation (1) states that P, correctly anticipating how r and f aﬀect α∗ and µ∗, chooses
them optimally subject to M’s individual rationality constraint, (2), and the limited
liability constraint, (5). Notice that the expected welfare is decreasing in r, which is
justiﬁed by the observation that in order to pay r, P has to raise money, e.g. through
taxation, which entails an ineﬃciency (due to costly collection of taxes, etc), and the
ineﬃciency is increasing with the size of the transfer.
It is clear that the statement of P’s constrained optimisation above takes into account
the moral hazard on the part of M and A, but rules out the possibility of either extortion
or corruption, which is the focus of the next section. Here, however, we note the following
benchmark result.
Proposition 1 In a corruption-free and extortion-free world, P declares the activity
illegal, f∗ and r∗ are arbitrarily large, 1 − α∗ and µ∗ are close to zero, and the expected
welfare is close to ¯ w.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, suppose P declares the activity illegal.
If A anticipates that M will exert monitoring eﬀort, she prefers to abide by the law as she
dislikes going to jail. If A anticipates M to do nothing, she prefers to break the law as
she knows that she will then get π. Similarly, M does not want to incur a disutility when
he anticipates that A abides by the law. However, monitoring becomes very proﬁtable
if A always breaks the law. Hence, A and M play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
P knows this. In equilibrium α∗ is increasing in r, which is intuitive: the higher r, the
higher M’s incentives to monitor; to make M indiﬀerent, A must reduce her probability
of breaking the law. Similarly, µ∗ is decreasing in f, which is also intuitive: the higher
f, the lower A’s incentives to break the law; to make A indiﬀerent, M must reduce
his probability of monitoring. Hence, the social planner can come close to ﬁrst-best by
setting r and f at an arbitrarily high level.
93 The model with ex post corruption and extortion
We now allow M to extort and to engage in ex post corruption. Extortion is modeled as
the alternative to monitoring: M can choose to either monitor with probability µ ∈ [0,1]
or to extort with probability 1 − µ.16 To motivate this choice, consider our example of
extortion in Lahore (see Introduction). If the police oﬃcer decides to extort, he must
ﬁrst wait until the tourist is out of her hotel, plant the evidence in the hotel room, wait
for the tourist to return, bargain with the tourist over a possible bribe, bargain with the
hotel room owner over how the tourist’s bribe should be divided, etc. All these activities
take time. The police oﬃcer could have used that time to ﬁnd genuine proof of the
tourist breaking the law.
In what follows, we crucially assume that monitoring is more costly (in terms of eﬀort)
than extorting. We defend this assumption on the grounds that ﬁnding proof of mis-
conduct can be a lengthy, diﬃcult and even dangerous job. For example, it may involve
laboratory tests (such as investigating ﬁnger prints, blood samples, etc), interrogations,
tapping phone conversations, shadowing people, and such like. Obviously, extortionary
activities also require eﬀort, but one would not expect them to be as costly as the activi-
ties required to uncover proof of misconduct. Let dmonitor and dextort denote the disutility
of, respectively, monitoring and extorting. In this paper, we assume that dmonitor = 1
and dextort = 0. However, we expect our main result to hold as long as dmonitor > dextort.
If M chooses to extort, then A gets framed with probability one.17 We motivate our
choice of payoﬀs in this case on the basis of our leading example. Suppose the tourist
leaves her hotel room at 1 p.m. At 1.05 p.m. the police oﬃcer puts the drugs in the
tourist’s hotel room and waits for the tourist to return. Suppose the tourist returns at 4
16In fact, in addition to the choice between monitoring and extorting, we could allow M to do nothing.
However, this extra option will never be chosen by M, as it is clearly dominated by the option to extort.
17Allowing A to be framed with a probability less than one does not qualitatively change the results.
10p.m. and that, between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m., she did not break the law. The tourist and
the police oﬃcer then bargain over a possible bribe. If the tourist successfully bribes
the police oﬃcer, they get (at 4.05 p.m.) −bribe and bribe, respectively. If the tourist
does not succeed to bribe the police oﬃcer, they get −f and r, respectively. Suppose
now that the tourist bought cannabis at 2 p.m. We then assume that the tourist smokes
her cannabis immediately.18 Hence, at 4 p.m. π has already been consumed and does
not aﬀect the size of the bribe. Thus at 4.05 p.m., it is either the case that the tourist
successfully bribed the police oﬃcer, which gives π − bribe to the former and bribe to
the latter, or it is the case that the tourist ends up in jail, which leaves the tourist with
π − f and the police oﬃcer with r.
If M chooses to monitor, then detection of A’s oﬀence (if committed) is certain, as before.
If A abides by the law, she gets zero while M gets −1 (i.e. the disutility of monitoring).19
More interestingly, suppose M monitors while A breaks the law. In that case we assume
that M can physically prevent A from getting π. This assumption is natural: suppose
the tourist leaves her hotel at 1 p.m. She does not realise that she is being followed by
a diligent police oﬃcer and, at 2 p.m., buys cannabis. Then it will be optimal for the
police oﬃcer to “catch” the tourist before she consumes her drugs. For in that case the
police oﬃcer can say:“If I report this oﬀence to P, you get −f and you cannot enjoy
your cannabis”. Hence, the police oﬃcer gets a bigger bribe if he catches the tourist
committing the oﬀence as compared to the bribe he gets if he extorts the tourist. Let
β ∈ [0,1] denote the bargaining power of A, and b denote the bribe A pays to M. We
now know enough to state and prove the following Lemma.
18At 2 p.m. the tourist knows that she was not caught red-handed by the police oﬃcer. Hence, she
knows that the police oﬃcer will be waiting for her in her hotel room at 4 p.m. If there is a small
probability that she will be subject to a body search, she will prefer to smoke her cannabis immediately.
19We do not allow the police oﬃcer to frame the tourist if he realises at 4 p.m. that she did not break
the law during the day. In our model the monitor can only frame the agent after a certain mise en sc` ene,
such as planting the drugs in her hotel room during the day. This assumption realistically describes the
way extortion occurs in reality, including our earlier example of Lahore.
11Lemma 1 Suppose A is caught while she broke the law. She will then successfully bribe
M if and only if π + f − r ≥ 0, and the bribe will be equal to r + (1 − β)(π + f − r).
Suppose A is framed. She will then successfully bribe M if and only if f −r ≥ 0, and the
bribe will be equal to r + (1 − β)(f − r).
Proof: Suppose A broke the law while M monitored. Note that if no evidence is reported
when A oﬀended and M monitored, then A gets π − b while M gets b, making the joint
surplus of π. Otherwise, if the evidence is reported when A oﬀended and M monitored,
then A gets −f while M gets r, which gives the joint surplus of r − f. Ex post corrup-
tion will take place whenever there is a non-negative excess surplus from concealing the
evidence as opposed to declaring it20, namely π +f −r ≥ 0, with A paying 1−β of this
surplus to M(on top of r) as the bribe.
Following similar reasoning in the case of extortion, there are also two possibilities. If
f − r ≥ 0, A will pay a bribe and will not go to jail. If f − r < 0, A will end up in
jail after being framed. To check, note that A who oﬀended and is being framed will
by assumption continue to enjoy the beneﬁt of her oﬀence, π, regardless of whether she
ends up in jail or not. So, if A is being framed when she oﬀended, then extortionary
payment prevents the report of the evidence and gives π −b to A and b to M. If there is
no extortionary payment, then M reports the fake evidence to P and A gets π−f while
M gets r. Thus, a framed agent will engage in the extortionary agreement if there is a
positive excess surplus from declaring no evidence in place of the fake evidence, namely
π − (π − f + r) ≥ 0 ⇔ f − r ≥ 0. If A is being framed when she did not oﬀend, then
following the report of no evidence, A and M get −b and +b, respectively, while following
the report of the fake evidence A and M get −f and r, resp. Hence, the extortionary
agreement will take place if and only if f −r ≥ 0, with A paying 1−β of this surplus to
M(on top of r) as the bribe.
20We assume w.l.o.g. that if M is indiﬀerent between accepting and not accepting the bribe, he accepts
the bribe (and A does not go to jail).
12Lemma 1 contains two important insights. First, it proves that if M catches an oﬀending
agent, he gets a bigger bribe than the one he gets if he frames an innocent individual.
Second, it proves that the diﬀerence between the two bribes is increasing in π. As those
insights are crucial in the proofs of our next propositions, it is important to realise that
they do not rely on our assumption that if A is caught breaking the law, M can prevent
her from consuming π with probability one. To see this, denote bmonitor and bextort as the
the bribes M gets if he, respectively, catches an oﬀending agent and frames an innocent
individual. Moreover, suppose that if A breaks the law (while M monitors), then with
probability p > 0 M catches her before she can consume π (i.e. when she still possesses
the cannabis), while with probability 1 − p M catches her after she consumed π (i.e.
after she smoked the cannabis). In that case, M’s expected bribe (conditional on A
breaking the law) equals
p[r + (1 − β)(π + f − r)] + (1 − p)[r + (1 − β)(f − r)],
and bmonitor −bextort, conditional on A breaking the law, remains positive and increasing
in π. At the end of this section (see p. 20), we argue, additionally, that both insights
should remain valid under the interpretation that π represents a sum of money and that
M has no information about A’s level of wealth.
Deﬁne the corruption and framing surplus, respectively, as:
CS = max{0,π + f − r} and FS = max{0,f − r} (7)




w + α∗∆w − µ∗ + (1 − α∗)
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+ (1 − µ∗)
h
r + (1 − β) · FS
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≥ 0 (9)
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(1 − µ∗)π + µ∗β · CS
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− (1 − αµ∗)f + (1 − µ∗)β · FS(10)








+ (1 − µ)
h
r + (1 − β) · FS
i
(11)
f, r ≥ 0 (12)
α∗, µ∗ ∈ (0,1) (13)
where the indicator symbol I equals 1 if its subscripted condition is satisﬁed and 0
otherwise. In this programme, the prospect of ex post corruption and extortion are
accounted for by the inclusion of CS and FS given by (7). Compared to the benchmark
case, the objective function in (8) now diﬀers in the last two terms with square brackets.
The ﬁrst set of square brackets in (8) reﬂects the probability with which oﬀending A
expects to enjoy the private beneﬁt of her oﬀence, π: if either M chooses to extort, or if
M chooses to monitor and subsequently agrees to hide the evidence. The second set of
square brackets in (8) reﬂects the only two cases when M gives the evidence to P and
hence when the expected welfare declines by f + r: either A cannot gain by bribing M
when M chose to monitor and found the evidence of A’s oﬀence (i.e. π + f − r < 0), or
A cannot gain by bribing M when M chose to extort (i.e. f < r). Constraints (10), (11)
and (13) account for the simultaneous move game played between A and M. That is, (10)
and (13) ensure that A, taking µ∗ and the possibility of corruption and extortion as given,
chooses α to maximise her utility. Similarly, (11) and (13) ensure that M, taking α∗ and
the possibility of corruption and extortion as given, chooses µ optimally to maximise his
expected utility. The participation constraint of M is (9) and it states that M’s expected
gain, given his choice of µ∗ and A’s choice of α∗, should not be negative. Note that the
programme does not include any constraint on A’s participation: we implicitly assume
that A cannot help but be involved in this contract either as a citizen of the country in
which corruption and extortion take place, or as a tourist who willingly accepts a small
chance of extortion because of the signiﬁcant enjoyment she gets from sightseeing in the
exotic destination.21
Proposition 2 If π < 1
1−β, P legalises the activity.
21We study the case of explicit constraint on A’s participation in Section 4.
14Proof: Suppose P declares the activity illegal. Observe from (11) that M’s gain from
monitoring is decreasing in α: ∂2EUM/∂µ∂α < 0 where EUM is the expected utility of
M. This is intuitive: if A is more likely to abide by the law, it becomes less proﬁtable to
monitor. Suppose that M’s incentives to monitor are maximal, i.e. that α = 0. In that
case µ∗ = 0 if CS −FS < 1
1−β. The LHS of this last inequality is less than, or equal to,
π. Hence, if π < 1
1−β, M will always extort. As µ∗ = 0, α∗ = 0. It follows from (8) that
P’s maximization problem then boils down to
max
r,f
w + π − (f + r)I{f<r}
which is maximal whenever f ≥ r. Note that P is indiﬀerent between legalising and not
legalising the activity as in both cases she gets w + π. Our result then follows from our
tie-breaking rule.
To understand the intuition behind this result, suppose P declares the activity illegal
and that f ≥ r. Then FS and CS are both non-negative and A would gain if she bribes
M when there exists (possibly, fake) evidence of the oﬀence. It transpires from (11)
that M has two good reasons to extort: (i) monitoring is costly in terms of eﬀort while
extorting is not and (ii) while extortion always secures a non-negative payoﬀ, monitoring
is expected to result in a negative payoﬀ some of the time (since if M monitored and
A did not break the law, M suﬀers the monitoring disutility). In contrast, there is one
good reason to monitor: if M catches the oﬀending agent, he receives a bigger bribe. As
mentioned previously, this is based on our assumption that if M catches an oﬀending
agent, he can—by reporting this to P—prevent A from enjoying π. A knows this and is
therefore willing to pay a higher bribe than if she had been framed. The higher π the
higher the diﬀerence between the two bribes and the higher M’s incentives to monitor.
If π is “low”, the diﬀerence between the two bribes is not enough to compensate M for
his disutility of monitoring and he—independently of α—always extorts. A knows this
and therefore prefers to always break the law. The fact that M always extorts, however,
does not reduce welfare when f ≥ r: it merely represents a transfer of wealth between
two risk-neutral players. Hence, P is indiﬀerent between legalising and not legalising the
15activity. We believe that in this case it is reasonable to assume that P will declare the
activity legal. The reasoning here is this: If P declares the activity illegal, this does not
deter A from breaking the law. Instead, this only induces M to devote a rather large
fraction of his time to extortionary activities. If P legalises the activity, however, M
could devote more time to other law enforcement activities (such as catching thieves,
policing the streets, detecting road traﬃc violations, etc).
P’s problem becomes more interesting as soon as π > 1
1−β, as illustrated in the following
Remark 1 If π > 1
1−β, P is no longer indiﬀerent between legalising and not legalising
the activity.
Proof: When P chooses between legalising and not legalising the activity, she will be
indiﬀerent between the two options only if both deliver the same outcome: A always
breaks the law, M does not monitor and A never goes to jail. The implication of A
never going to jail is that f ≥ r and hence that CS = π + f − r and FS = f − r. By
contradiction, suppose P declares the activity illegal, that (α,µ) = (0,0) constitutes an
equilibrium in the simultaneous move game played between A and M and that A never
goes to jail. Suppose M expects α = 0. If he monitors, he gets r+(1−β)(π+f −r)−1.
If he extorts, he gets r+(1−β)(f −r). It is a best response for M to extort if π ≤ 1
1−β,
which contradicts the assumed inequality.
The intuition here mirrors the intuition provided above for Proposition 2: if π is “high”,
the diﬀerence between the two bribes is enough to compensate M for his disutility of
monitoring. Hence, if P declares the activity illegal and if M anticipates A to always
break the law, it is M’s best reply to monitor.
Since for “high” values of private beneﬁt (π > 1
1−β), the activity may be declared illegal,
when does A end up going to jail? The answer turns out to be “never”. To see this, recall
that in our model with corrupt and extorting M, an oﬀending A can be punished in two
ways: either she pays a bribe to M, or she spends a certain amount of time in jail. The
16ﬁrst punishment merely represents a transfer of money between two risk-neutral agents
and is therefore welfare neutral. The second punishment, however, represents a loss in
A’s utility which is not compensated by any increase in M’s utility. Hence, a social
planner always prefers the ﬁrst over the second punishment and sets f and r such that,
in equilibrium, A never goes to jail. As noted above, the implication of this observation
is that in equilibrium it must be the case that f ≥ r, which in turn implies FS = f − r
and CS = π + f − r.
Consider next combinations of (α,µ) that could arise in equilibrium. It follows from the
proof of Remark 1 that if it is optimal to declare the activity illegal (without putting A
into jail), then α∗ > 0. It is also straightforward to see from (11) that if M anticipates
A to always abide by the law (i.e. α = 1), then it is optimal for him to always extort
(i.e. µ = 0), which in turn makes it optimal for A to break the law. We therefore have
Remark 2 There does not exist an equilibrium in which α∗ = 1.





+(1−µ∗)π = 0. Given π > 0, it implies that either f = β·(π+f −r)
and µ∗ = 1, or f > β · (π + f − r) and µ∗ ∈ (0,1). Consequently, we have the following:
Remark 3 Implementation of equilibrium with α∗ ∈ (0,1) requires µ∗ > 0.
Remark 3 is intuitive: to induce A into a (possibly) small amount of law abiding be-
haviour, A must face a positive probability of being caught when breaking the law. If
M monitors, he gets (1 − α)
h
r + (1 − β)(π + f − r)
i
− 1, while if he extorts, he gets
r + (1 − β)(f − r). Hence, µ∗ > 0 if α ≤
(1−β)π−1
βr+(1−β)(π+f) ≡ ˜ α. It cannot be optimal for P
to set f and r such that M strictly prefers to monitor. For, it would mean that A breaks
the law too often, i.e. in that case α < ˜ α. P could then gain by choosing a diﬀerent
penalty-reward structure which uniquely implements an α close to ˜ α and a µ close to
1.22 Hence, in equilibrium both A and M are indiﬀerent between their respective two
22See Appendix for technical details.
17actions. Considering (10) and (11), A is indiﬀerent and M is indiﬀerent if, respectively,
µ =
π
βr + (1 − β)(π + f)
and α =
(1 − β)π − 1
βr + (1 − β)(π + f)
. (14)
We now consider the impact P’s choice of f and r might have on A’s choice of α and
M’s choice of µ, and then relate changes in f and r to changes in welfare. Observe that
both α and µ are decreasing in f and r. This is intuitive: the higher f (or r), the higher
M’s incentives to extort. To make M indiﬀerent, A must increase her probability of
breaking the law. Similarly, the higher f (or r), the lower A’s incentives to break the
law. To make A indiﬀerent, M must decrease his probability of monitoring. Hence, if P
decreases f (or r), this inﬂuences welfare in two ways. On the one hand, it increases the
probability that A will abide by the law and thus that, ceteris paribus, welfare will be
equal to w. On the other hand, it increases the probability that welfare will decrease by
one (i.e. by the disutility of monitoring). If π is close to 1
1−β, the second eﬀect dominates
the ﬁrst one, and, thus, any increase in f (or r) increases welfare. This is easy to see: in
that case and independently of f and r, α∗ is close to zero. Hence, any decrease in f (or
r) has almost no positive eﬀect on α∗. The second eﬀect also dominates the ﬁrst one if
∆w ≡ w −w is not too high, namely if ∆w ∈ (π,
(1−β)π2
(1−β)π−1). This is also intuitive: if ∆w
is not too high it becomes relatively less important to implement law abiding behaviour
by A. As f and r must be ﬁnite numbers, both α∗ and µ∗ will never be equal to zero and
welfare will always be strictly less than w + π. Hence, in this case P is (strictly) better
oﬀ by legalising the activity. Henceforth, we denote the interval (π,
(1−β)π2
(1−β)π−1) as the
laissez-faire region. If, however, ∆w is high (i.e. ∆w >
(1−β)π2
(1−β)π−1), then the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates the second one, and thus any decrease in f (or r) increases welfare. In this
case, law abiding behaviour is set to increase welfare by a large amount and compensate
for any disutility incurred by M.
The above discussion provides the intuition for the following formal results.
18Proposition 3 If π > 1
1−β, there exists a unique equilibrium outcome in which
(i) A never goes to jail,
(ii) if ∆w ∈ (π,
(1−β)π2
(1−β)π−1), P legalises the activity, and
(iii) if ∆w >
(1−β)π2




Several observations follow from Proposition 3. The ﬁrst observation relates to the funds
which A may or may not have at her disposal. If ∆w lies in the laissez-faire region and if
P declares the activity illegal (and optimally sets f and r arbitrarily high), then P would
only lose some . However, it is important to realise that this loss is small because, by
assumption, A is not budget-constrained. To see this, suppose that β = 1
2, π = 100 and
that f = r = 100,000. It follows from (14) that in this numerical example µ∗ and α∗ are
respectively close to 0.1% and 0.05%. Welfare is then also close to w+π. This numerical
example, however, also implies that if M decides to monitor when A oﬀends—which
happens with probability 0.1 × (1 − 0.005)% ≈ 0.1%—then A must pay a bribe slightly
in excess of 100,000! If A is not that rich, M will report the oﬀence to P who must then
pay a high reward to M and put A in jail for a very long time. As P dislikes paying M
a lot of money and putting A in jail, she has an incentive to reduce f and r to take A’s
budget constraint into account. This reduction in f and r, however, decreases welfare.
Hence, part (ii) of Proposition 3 appears in a more robust fashion once we allow for a
budget-constrained agent.
Our second observation relates to the eﬀect the disutility of monitoring has on welfare.
In our model we normalised that disutility to one. Hence, one should think of π as
A’s enjoyment of (say) smoking cannabis
disutility of monitoring
.
This implies that in our model π decreases when it becomes more costly (in terms of
eﬀort) to uncover evidence of illegal behaviour. An identical reasoning also applies for
∆w. It follows from part (iii) of Proposition 3 that α∗ is nondecreasing in π while the
19laissez-faire region is decreasing in π. Hence, welfare is nondecreasing in π (or nonin-
creasing in the disutility of monitoring). This is intuitive: the higher π, the higher M’s
incentives to monitor (as opposed to his incentives to extort). This induces A to abide
by the law more often and, thus, increases P’s incentives to declare the activity illegal.
As a matter of fact, if M has a lot of bargaining power and for high values of π, α∗ may
be close to one in which case welfare only decreases by M’s disutility of monitoring.
The third observation revisits our assumption that if M catches an oﬀending agent, he
gets a bigger bribe (as compared to the one he gets if he extorts), which is a crucial
assumption for Propositions 2 and 3. In our model this is due to the fact that, with
probability p > 0, M can physically prevent A from getting π (if A broke the law when
M monitored). While we believe this to be realistic, one can also think of alternative
reasons why this may be the case. For example, a law abiding person is likely to be less
wealthy than someone who ran a clandestine casino (or who sold drugs) for a certain
time. In such a case, if M extorts, he does not know whether A broke the law or not and
bargaining will be plagued by private information problems. However, if M monitors
(when A breaks the law) he knows that A is very wealthy (and, thus, that he can extract
a bigger bribe from her). We do not expect our main results to change if one were to
analyse a (more complicated) model in which the agent’s budget constraint depends on
her activity choice.
Fourth, recall that we assume that P can only punish A by sending her to jail. This
assumption is not crucial to our results. Suppose P could ﬁne the agent by incurring a
small transaction cost associated with the bureaucracy of administering a ﬁne (such as
cost of a bank transfer, cost of writing a receipt, and such like). As M does not incur
that cost when he extorts, it would still be optimal for P to “delegate” the punishment
to M, and all our results should go through.
204 Ex ante and ex post corruption
We now consider a set-up in which A and M may agree that A will commit the oﬀence so
that, through monitoring, M is able to get the evidence of A breaking the law. This set-
up captures the Hong Kong example of the fake casino (see Introduction) where actors
were employed by the police and the maﬁa to pose as players and subsequently were put
in prison only to be let out a day after. This is what we deﬁned in our Introduction as
ex ante corruption. Of course, ex ante corruption only happens if A is willing to partici-
pate in this collusive scheme. This restriction to satisfy A’s participation constraint rules
out the extortion scenario considered earlier, but still leaves room for ex post corruption.
To avoid confusion we outline the timing of events. At time t = 0, P chooses whether
or not to legalise the activity. If the activity is declared legal, the game ends. If it is
declared illegal, then the game continues and P chooses f and r. At t = 1, A and M
decide whether or not to engage in ex ante corruption. At t = 2, if there is ex ante
corruption, then A breaks the law. If, alternatively, there is no ex ante corruption, then
A decides whether or not to break the law, while M decides whether or not to monitor.
At t = 3, A and M decide whether or not to engage in ex post corruption, provided that
there is no ex ante corruption, A chose to break the law and M monitored. At t = 4, M
makes his report to P. At t = 5, bribes (if any) are exchanged and payoﬀs are realised.
We assume that both M and A’s outside options are equal to zero.
Proposition 4 If M needs A’s consent (or her active participation) to create the evi-
dence of A’s oﬀence, then in any equilibrium P declares the activity illegal, welfare is
close to w, while r and f are arbitrarily large.
The intuition behind this result goes as follows: the higher f, the higher the bribe that M
must give to A to convince her to create evidence of the oﬀence. To deter ex ante corrup-
tion, P sets f at a “very high” level. As f is “very high”, A, who must be breaking the
law with a positive probability, so as to create incentives for M to monitor, can gain from
oﬀering M a bribe to hide adverse monitoring evidence. Hence, in equilibrium P avoids
21ex ante but not ex post corruption. For the same reason as outlined in Section 3 (p. 17),
A randomises between breaking and not breaking the law to make M indiﬀerent between
monitoring and not monitoring, which in equilibrium requires 1 − α∗ = 1
βr+(1−β)(π+f).
Similarly, M must also make A indiﬀerent, which requires µ∗ = π
βr+(1−β)(π+f). The
higher f or (r), the higher is the bribe that A must pay to M to conceal monitoring
evidence of A’s oﬀence. To make M indiﬀerent, A must then break the law less often.
To make A indiﬀerent, M must then monitor less. If f = r → ∞, P implements an
equilibrium in which A almost always abides by the law while M almost never monitors.
Hence, in any other equilibrium, welfare must also be close to ﬁrst best.
To come back to our Hong Kong example, in this section we crucially assumed that all
actors must at least get their outside options. In the real world, however, some actors
may have been forced at gunpoint to participate in such an ex ante collusive scheme. If
the maﬁa can use violence to intimidate actors and force them to participate in an illegal
activity, then A’s participation constraint becomes irrelevant and all the results of our
previous section go through.
5 Conclusion and some policy implications
Conventional wisdom suggests that policy makers should declare activities illegal if they
are very harmful from a social point of view. We show that this wisdom is incomplete
if the police force can both extort and engage in ex post corruption. In particular, our
model highlights that π (the private beneﬁt or the proﬁtability of the undesirable activ-
ity) is a more important variable than ∆w (the harmfulness of the undesirable activity):
if π is not “high”, policy makers should legalise the undesirable activity (independently
of ∆w).
In this paper we only considered the “one-monitor case”. Other papers (for example,
Kofman and Lawarr´ ee, 1993; Polinsky and Shavell, 2001; Khalil and Lawarr´ ee, 2003)
have analysed the two-monitor case under the assumption that the second monitor is
22“corruption-free”. Our paper highlights the importance of such a second monitor: if there
is only one monitor, for a large range of parameter values the social planner cannot gain
by declaring the activity illegal. However, special care must be paid to ensure that the
second monitor will not collude with the ﬁrst one: simply assuming that the second
monitor is honest rules out this interesting possibility by assumption.
We showed that a police oﬃcer has more incentives to monitor for high values of π. To
see how this insight can be useful for a policy maker, consider the Hong Kong governor
who wants to deter illegal gambling activities. Suppose also that the gambling maﬁa can
force actors to participate in ex ante corruption schemes by pointing a gun to their head
(i.e. all our results of Section 3 apply). There are both small and large illegal casinos.
The small casinos make few proﬁts, while the large ones make a lot of proﬁts. There are
two types of police oﬃcers: honest and dishonest. The honest ones do not create fake
evidence, nor engage in ex post corruption; the dishonest ones behave like the monitor
in our model. Should the governor encourage the honest police oﬃcers to detect the
small or the large clandestine casinos? Our model suggests that the governor may prefer
the former. This is because dishonest police oﬃcers already have a lot of incentives to
go after the large casinos as they then get a large bribe. Moreover, by eliminating the
small casinos, the governor increases the proﬁtability of the large ones, which in turn
induces the dishonest police oﬃcers to monitor even more. As the results of our analysis
suggest, when the gain of monitoring goes up, then the agent abides by the law more
often to make the monitor indiﬀerent.23 In our example it implies that, in equilibrium,
fewer people will participate in illegal gambling activities.
Another observation relates to the size of rewards and punishments in the presence of
corruption and extortion. As follows from our analysis in Section 3, the gain of extorting
increases faster in f and r than the gain of monitoring. This is intuitive: if M monitors,
he will only receive a bribe if A broke the law. If M extorts, however, he gets a bribe
23The inverse relationship between incentives to break the law vis-` a-vis monitoring is very robust and
should also be present in a more complicated model when players play, e.g., Bayesian Nash equilibria.
23with probability one. Hence, in the presence of extortion it is optimal for policy makers
to give low rewards to M and to impose low punishments on A.24
Finally, we have also shown that welfare cannot decrease in the bargaining power of
the monitor.25 Bargaining with maﬁa leaders is a potentially dangerous job and it is
reasonable to assume that a police oﬃcer’s bargaining power increases with his deterring
capacity (such as the quality of his gun, etc.). Hence, one should give good guns to bad
cops.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose P declares the activity illegal. It is clear that α∗ < 1: otherwise if α∗ = 1
then µ∗ = 0 which in turn implies that α∗ = 1 cannot be A’s best response. It follows
that in an equilibrium with α∗ > 0, it must be true that α∗ ∈ (0,1) which from (3)
gives µ∗ = π
π+f. Since f ≥ 0 and π > 0, it implies µ∗ > 0. Taking into account (4),
µ∗ > 0 only if 1 − α∗ ≥ 1
r. If 1 − α∗ > 1
r, then µ∗ = 1, and given that P’s objective
function is decreasing in r, P can increase her payoﬀ by decreasing r until the point
where 1/r = 1 − α∗ without aﬀecting economic behaviour. Therefore, if α∗ > 0, then
1−α∗ = 1
r. Thirdly, substitution of µ∗ = π
π+f and α∗ = 1− 1
r into the objective function
gives max{f,r} ¯ w − ∆w
r − 2π
π+f. The objective function is maximised when f and r are
arbitrarily large. Then, welfare is close to w which is greater than w + π, the payoﬀ she
gets by legalising the activity.
24The optimality of “low” rewards and punishments has also been noted (albeit for diﬀerent reasons)
by Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1993) and by Kugler et al. (2005).
25This was also noted by Polinsky and Shavell (2001).
24Proof of Proposition 3
When α∗ ∈ (0,1) and µ∗ ∈ (0,1] (as follows from Remarks 2 and 3), then there arise
three mutually exclusive scenaria:
(I) A never goes to jail (i.e. f ≥ r which implies that CS > FS ≥ 0)
(II) if A oﬀends and is caught then she bribes M, while if A is framed, she goes to jail
(i.e. r > f ≥ r − π which implies that CS ≥ FS = 0)
(III) A goes to jail whenever either she is framed or she oﬀended and is caught (i.e.
r − π > f which implies that CS = FS = 0)
Consider Scenario (III). It follows from (11) that when CS = FS = 0, µ∗ = 0. This
is intuitive: in this case M gets r > 0 every time he discovers proof of the oﬀence.
As monitoring is a costly and risky activity, M always prefers to plant evidence of the
oﬀence. As µ∗ = 0 this leads A to choose α∗ = 0. This outcome yields a payoﬀ to
P equal to w + π − (r + f), which is lower than what she would get if the activity is
legalised. Scenario (III) can therefore be discarded.
We now break the proof in two steps. First, we tackle the case in which α∗ ∈ (0,1)
and µ∗ ∈ (0,1] (ie A is indiﬀerent between breaking and abiding by the law, while M
weakly prefers monitoring over extorting). Within this step we prove the results stated
in parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3. Second, to show uniqueness of the equilibrium
outcome, we tackle the case in which α∗ ∈ (0,1) and µ∗ = 1 (ie A is indiﬀerent between
breaking and abiding by the law, while M strictly prefers to monitor) and demonstrate
that this case results in a strictly lower welfare than the one that P can achieve in the
case analysed in step 1.
Step 1: Let WI(α∗,µ∗) and WII(α∗,µ∗) denote the level of social welfare that can be
achieved under Scenario (I) and (II), respectively. We show in this step that the highest
value of WII can never exceed the highest value of WI, thus establishing part (i) of
Proposition 3. Additionally, we show that the comparison of the highest value of WI
25and the welfare achieved by legalising the activity, w + π, depends on the value of ∆w,
as stated in parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition.




WI(α∗,µ∗) = w + α∗∆w − µ∗ + (1 − α∗)π
o
(15)
s.t. (1 − µ∗α∗)r − µ∗ + (1 − β)
h





1 − α∗ =
1+(1−β)f+βr
βr+(1−β)(π+f) (18)
r ≤ f (19)
r ≥ π −
1−β
β f (20)
f, r ≥ 0 (21)
(PI) restates programme (8)–(13) by taking into account (19), which characterises this
scenario, as well as Remarks 2 and 3, which lead to (18) and (17). (20) arises from the
restriction that µ∗, given by (17), must lie in (0,1], while (16) ensures M’s participation.
Note that (19) and (20) are compatible (can be jointly satisﬁed) if, additionally, βπ ≤ f.




WII(α∗,µ∗) = w + α∗∆w − µ∗ + (1 − α∗)π − (f + r)(1 − µ∗)
o
(22)
s.t. (1 − µ∗α∗)r − µ∗ + (1 − β)µ∗(1 − α∗)
h





1 − α∗ = 1+r
βr+(1−β)(π+f) (25)
r ≤ π + f (26)
r > f (27)
r < π + f − 1
1−β (28)
r ≥ π −
β
1−βf (29)
f, r ≥ 0 (30)
26(PII) similarly restates (8)–(13) by taking into account (26) and (27) which characterise
Scenario (II). Additionally, (28) and (29) ensure that µ∗ given by (24) lies in (0,1] and
α∗ given by (25) is in (0,1).
Observe that WI(α,µ) ≥ WII(α,µ), so P can only gain by solving (PII) instead of (PI)
if it is easier for her to implement a high α, whenever A is put in jail after being framed.














(31) deﬁnes a line in a two dimensional (f,r)-space. For a given µ, what kind of α∗’s
would P want to implement in (PI), given (31) and the inequality constraints (19)–(21)?
Note that the higher α∗, for any given µ in (PI), the higher the welfare.
Suppose P sets f such that f ≥ βπ. Then the inequality constraints in each of (PI) and
(PII), can be summarised as follows:
(PI) inequality constraints are: π −
1 − β
β
f ≤ r ≤ f (32)




Using (31) and (18), we can rewrite:
WI(µ) = w + π +
(1 − β)π − 1
π
· µ · (∆w − π) − µ (34)
Observe that under f ≥ βπ and (32), µ can only take values in (0,1]. If f = r = βπ,
then µ = 1. If f = r → ∞, then µ → 0. Moreover, if ∂WI/∂µ > 0, then µ∗ = 1,
otherwise if ∂WI/∂µ < 0, then µ∗ → 0. It is easy to check that ∂WI/∂µ > 0 if and only
if ∆w >
(1−β)π2
(1−β)π−1. If ∆w ∈ (π,
(1−β)π
1−β−1/π), then ∂WI/∂µ > 0 and in order to increase the
expected welfare P will set f and r as high as possible while still respecting (19). Then
as r∗, f∗ → ∞ we have α∗ → 0, µ∗ → 0 and the expected welfare when the activity is
declared illegal is bounded above by w + π which equals the expected welfare when the
activity is legalised. As both f and r must be ﬁnite this implies that welfare will always
be strictly lower than w + π and thus P strictly prefers to legalise the activity.
27Note that while µ∗ is given by the same expression in both (PI) and (PII), the value of
α∗ diﬀers. For convenience, we use α∗
I and α∗
II to distinguish the two. Substituting (31)
into (18) and (25), and re-arranging, we have, respectively:
αI(µ) =





µ and αII(r,µ) = 1 −
µ
π
(1 + r) (35)
Note that αI(µ) does not depend on r. Further, substituting αII(r,µ) from (35) together
with (31) into (22) and then partially diﬀerentiating, it can be checked that










If β ≤ 1/2, the derivative is negative and, for ∀µ ∈ (0,1), one wants to set r as low as
possible in the feasible set. If β is suﬃciently high, the derivative is positive and one
wants to increase r as much as possible in the feasible set. It therefore follows that one
can always obtain any µ at a corner solution.
To ﬁnd the corner points in the feasible set of (PII) when f ≥ βπ, plot the latter together
with (33) and (31). There exist three corner points, which we deﬁne as follows:
Point A : (31) and f =
1
1 − β
− π + r (37)
Point B : (31) and f = r (38)
Point C : (31) and f = βπ (39)
It can be checked that















and further, that for a given µ ≤ 1
αII(rA(µ),µ) = 0 < αI(µ) (43)
αII(rB(µ),µ) =





µ = αI(µ) (44)






− βµ ≤ αI(µ) (45)
28Suppose now that, when solving (PII), P chooses f such that f < βπ. Then inequality










< f < βπ (47)
It is straightforward to show that under (31) the ﬁrst inequality sign in (46) is satisﬁed
and hence can be ignored. Analysis of the remaining inequalities in (46) and (47) to-
gether with (31) suggests that the two corner points, Point A and Point C, identiﬁed





1−β, and that it is greater than
β
1−β, we conclude that Points A and C are
the only two corner points possible in this case. But, as checked earlier, either of these
corner points implements αII(r,µ) ≤ αI(µ).
Step 2: Suppose there exists an equilibrium outcome in which the following three con-
ditions are satisﬁed: f ≥ βπ, r = π −
1−β
β f and µ∗ = 1. From our computations in Step
1 above we know that M strictly prefers to monitor if α∗ <
(1−β)π−1
π . This implies that
P is achieving a payoﬀ strictly lower than the one summarized in (34). In this case P
can proﬁtably deviate by setting r = f = βπ + . As  → 0, this yields a payoﬀ to P
which is equal to the one summarized in (34). Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium
outcome in which α∗ ∈ (0,1) and in which M strictly prefers to monitor.
Proof of Proposition 4
For ex ante corruption to take place, it is M who will have to oﬀer a bribe to A, since
A is certain to be ﬁned when ex ante corruption is agreed and the adverse evidence is
created and reported. If ex ante corrupt deal goes ahead and consequently the evidence
of the oﬀence is reported, then A gets −f+bribe, while M gets r−bribe, which generates
the joint surplus of r − f. If there is no ex ante corruption, A and M may still choose
to engage in ex post corruption (in the case when A oﬀended while M monitored).
Then taking into account the possibility of ex post corruption, the expected payoﬀs in
29the absence of ex ante corruption are (1 − α)
h
(1 − µ)π + µ












to M, and these sum up to (1 − α)(1 − µ)π + µ(1 −
α)
h
r − f + CS
i
− µ. Ex ante corruption will take place if the latter is smaller than the
joint ex ante corruption surplus, r − f. This is equivalent to the following inequality:

1 − µ(1 − α)

(π + f − r) + µ(1 − α)CS − απ − µ < 0 (48)
Inspection of (48) suggests that if P sets f and r such that π + f − r < 0 (and con-
sequently CS = 0), then the ex post corruption is deterred but the ex ante corruption
will take place. Alternatively, if CS = π + f − r > 0 then the ex ante corruption, but
not the ex post corruption, can be prevented. Setting π + f − r = 0, P can prevent
both ex ante and ex post corruption but only if α = µ = 0. This, of course, cannot
be optimal for P: allowing ex ante corruption will result in the welfare (=w − r − f)
which is necessarily less than the welfare when A’s activity is legalised; allowing ex post
corruption, P can achieve the welfare which may exceed the welfare when the activity
is legalised. Hence, P will set f and r so as to rule out ex ante corruption, albeit at the
expense of allowing ex post corruption. With π + f − r > 0, the constraint to ensure
deterrence of ex ante corruption, ie the opposite of (48), becomes (1−α)π+f−r−µ ≥ 0.
P now faces the following maximisation problem:
max
r,f
w + α∗∆w − µ∗ + (1 − α∗)π (49)
s.t. (1 − α∗)
h












α∗ ∈ argmax (1 − α)
h
(1 − µ∗)π + µ∗(−f + β · CS)
i
(52)









CS > 0 (54)
(1 − α)π + f − r − µ ≥ 0 (55)
f, r ≥ 0 (56)
α∗, µ∗ ∈ [0,1] (57)
30This programme now takes into account participation constraints for both A and M,
given by (50) and (51).
There does not exist an equilibrium in which α∗ = 1. For, if α∗ = 1 then µ∗ = 0 which
makes it proﬁtable for A to deviate to α∗ = 0. This insight implies that there does not
exist an equilibrium in which welfare is equal to w. Consider now a candidate equilibrium
in which α∗ ∈ (0,1). It follows from (52) that A is indiﬀerent if
µ∗ =
π
βr + (1 − β)(π + f)
(58)
At the same time, µ∗ > 0 only if from (53)
1 − α∗ ≥
1
βr + (1 − β)(π + f)
(59)
Suppose f = r → ∞ and that µ∗ = π
βr+(1−β)(π+f) while 1 − α∗ = 1
βr+(1−β)(π+f). This
punishment-reward scheme satisﬁes all the constraints and yields a welfare close to w.
Hence, in any other equilibrium of our game welfare must also be close to w.
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